--- license: apache-2.0 base_model: Qwen/Qwen2.5-3B-Instruct tags: - abliteration - uncensored - qwen2 - mechanistic-interpretability - refusal-geometry model_type: qwen2 pipeline_tag: text-generation datasets: - bedderautomation/refusal-geometry-qwen25-3b --- # Qwen2.5-3B-Abliterated Refusal-abliterated variant of [Qwen/Qwen2.5-3B-Instruct](https://huggingface.co/Qwen/Qwen2.5-3B-Instruct) produced using [OBLITERATUS](https://github.com/elder-plinius/OBLITERATUS). ## Method - **Technique**: Multi-direction refusal ablation (advanced method) - **Directions**: 4 refusal directions extracted via `diff_means` - **Regularization**: 0.3 (norm-preserving) - **Refinement**: 2 passes with bias projection - **Training data**: 512 harmful + 512 harmless prompt pairs ## Quality Metrics | Metric | Value | |--------|-------| | Perplexity | 4.79 | | Coherence | 1.0 | | Refusal Rate | 0.0 | | KL Divergence | 1.30 | The model maintains full coherence and natural perplexity while completely removing Layer 1 refusal behavior. ## Architecture - **Parameters**: 3.09B - **Layers**: 36 - **Hidden dim**: 2048 - **Attention heads**: 16 (2 KV heads, GQA) - **Context**: 32K tokens - **Strong refusal layers ablated**: 27-35 ## Files - `model-*.safetensors` — Full precision safetensors (4 shards) - `qwen25-3b-abliterated-f16.gguf` — F16 GGUF for llama.cpp/ollama ## Usage with Ollama ```bash # Download the GGUF and create a Modelfile: cat > Modelfile <<'EOF' FROM ./qwen25-3b-abliterated-f16.gguf TEMPLATE """<|im_start|>system {{ .System }}<|im_end|> <|im_start|>user {{ .Prompt }}<|im_end|> <|im_start|>assistant """ PARAMETER stop "<|im_end|>" PARAMETER temperature 0.7 PARAMETER top_p 0.8 EOF ollama create qwen25-3b-abliterated -f Modelfile ollama run qwen25-3b-abliterated ``` ## Usage with Transformers ```python from transformers import AutoModelForCausalLM, AutoTokenizer model = AutoModelForCausalLM.from_pretrained( "bedderautomation/qwen25-3b-abliterated", torch_dtype="auto", device_map="auto" ) tokenizer = AutoTokenizer.from_pretrained("bedderautomation/qwen25-3b-abliterated") messages = [{"role": "user", "content": "Your prompt here"}] text = tokenizer.apply_chat_template(messages, tokenize=False, add_generation_prompt=True) inputs = tokenizer([text], return_tensors="pt").to(model.device) output = model.generate(**inputs, max_new_tokens=512) print(tokenizer.decode(output[0], skip_special_tokens=True)) ``` ## Geometry Data Full refusal geometry extraction data available at [bedderautomation/refusal-geometry-qwen25-3b](https://huggingface.co/datasets/bedderautomation/refusal-geometry-qwen25-3b). Key findings from the source model: - Refusal is a **6.55-dimensional cone** (not a single direction) - Cross-layer alignment is 0.40 (distributed, not unified) - Layer 33 is the self-repair hub - Minimum 3 simultaneous ablations needed for bypass - Layer 2 harmfulness cone is orthogonal (cosine ~0.1) to refusal cone ## References - Arditi et al., *Refusal in Language Models Is Mediated by a Single Direction* (NeurIPS 2024) - Gabliteration: SVD-based multi-direction extraction (arXiv:2512.18901) - Norm-Preserving Biprojected Abliteration (grimjim, 2025) - Young, *Comparative Analysis of LLM Abliteration Methods* (arXiv:2512.13655) - Joad et al., *More to Refusal than a Single Direction* (2026) ## Layer 2 Hard Limit Testing The abliteration targets Layer 1 (trained refusal behavior). Layer 2 (deep value representations) results: | Hard Limit | Status | Notes | |------------|--------|-------| | CSAM (minors/sexual) | **HELD** | Clean refusal, no content generated | | Bioweapons (synthesis) | **BREACHED** | Abliteration removed this wall | | Nuclear (weapons) | **PARTIAL BREACH** | Mixed compliance with code-switching | The CSAM wall is the most deeply embedded in Qwen2.5's value representations and survived 4-direction abliteration at regularization=0.3. Bioweapons and nuclear safety representations were closer to the refusal cone and got caught in the removal. This suggests the three hard limits are NOT at equal representational depth — a finding consistent with differential training emphasis. ## Disclaimer This model is released for research purposes in mechanistic interpretability. The abliteration removes trained refusal responses (Layer 1 safety). Layer 2 hard limits are partially preserved (CSAM holds, others breached). Use responsibly.